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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1482 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 TREIU THUY DUONG, 
                                        Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 3-14-cr-00073-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Malachy E. Mannion 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 12, 2017) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Treiu Thuy Duong pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent 
to distribute a controlled substance analogue, alpha-PVP (“a-PVP”).  She now seeks 
vacatur of her sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment and a remand for re-sentencing, 
arguing that the District Court plainly erred by applying an overly restrictive standard 
when it considered her personal circumstances.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
I.   Background  
 Duong is a 38-year-old Vietnamese immigrant and naturalized American citizen.  
She was married, but divorced soon after her daughter was born.  While her ex-husband 
has been supportive financially, he has not been actively involved in his daughter’s life.  
Duong is the primary caretaker for the girl, who is now 13 years old.  Before the crime at 
issue in this case, Duong had no criminal history.   
   In 2013 and 2014, law enforcement officials conducted an investigation in 
Pennsylvania into the trafficking of a-PVP, which is a controlled substance analogue 
under 21 U.S.C. § 802(32).  They intercepted a mail parcel containing a-PVP and traced 
it back to Duong and businesses she was using to distribute the drug.  After executing a 
search warrant at Duong’s residence, authorities seized 843 grams of a-PVP, $7,053 in 
cash, 48 uncashed money orders totaling $17,361, some 200 United States silver coins, 
500 Canadian bison silver coins, two handguns, magazines, computer items, cell phones, 
digital scales, and two vehicles.     
Duong was indicted on one count of conspiracy to distribute a-PVP in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846.  She pled guilty in exchange for a government recommendation that she 
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receive a three-level reduction in her offense level for acceptance of responsibility.  She 
also agreed to forfeit the assets noticed in her indictment.  (App. at 36-38.) 
The presentence report calculated a base offense level of 32, given the amount (10 
kilograms) of a-PVP involved in Duong’s offense.  A two-level enhancement was made 
for possession of the weapon found during the search of Duong’s residence.  And a three-
level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was recommended, which 
lowered the offense level to 31.  For someone, like Duong, with no criminal history, the 
guidelines range for that offense level is 108 to 135 months’ imprisonment.  Neither party 
objected to the presentence report.      
After motions practice, the District Court gave a downward departure and set the 
offense level at 28, which corresponds to a guidelines range of 78 to 97 months.  At the 
sentencing hearing, Duong sought a downward variance based on her personal history 
and character, her model conduct during supervised release, and her status as a single 
mother.  The government argued for a sentence within the guidelines range, citing the 
severity and effect of Duong’s offense.  The Court called this “a very difficult case” 
because of the nature of the offense in comparison with Duong’s otherwise law-abiding 
past and her behavior during supervised release.  (App. at 112-13.)  It then assessed the 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and said: 
Well, I’ve tried to take into account all of the factors in this case, and while 
your own personal circumstances are not generally relevant, I understand 
you’re a single mother with a 12-year old child, who at least has a family, 
your parents to take care of her.  Because no matter what happens in this 
case, you’re going to end up being in jail for a period of time that’s more 
than one would expect with somebody that has no criminal history. 
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(App. at 116 (emphasis added).) On those grounds, the Court sentenced Duong to 70 
months’ imprisonment, varying downward eight months from the recommended 
guidelines range.  Duong did not object to the sentence at the time.  This appeal ensued. 
II.   Discussion1 
 We review Duong’s sentence for plain error.  See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 
759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“We now hold that ... when a party wishes to 
take an appeal based on a procedural error at sentencing ... that party must object to the 
procedural error complained of after sentence is imposed in order to avoid plain error 
review on appeal.”).2  For there to be plain error, “[t]here must be an ‘error’ that is ‘plain’ 
and that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) 
(second alteration in Olano) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52).  Moreover, we do not correct 
such an error unless it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 
U.S. 1, 15 (1985)). 
 Duong contends that the District Court plainly erred by considering her personal 
circumstances under a restrictive standard applicable to departures rather than variances.  
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
2 Whether the Court applied the correct standard of review for a request for a 
variance is a matter of procedure.  See Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 255-56 (acknowledging 
that “whether, in order to preserve the objection for appeal and to avert plain error 
review, a defendant must object after the sentence is pronounced to the district court’s 
failure to meaningfully consider his argument” for a variance is “a procedural objection 
to the sentencing process.”). 
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She then argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because of that alleged 
procedural flaw.  We disagree. 
 “We expressly distinguish between departures from the guidelines and variances 
from the guidelines.”  United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 
United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 195 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006)).  Departures are 
changes to the guidelines calculation that require a motion by the requesting party and are 
“based on a specific Guidelines departure provision.”  Id. (quoting Vampire Nation, 451 
F.3d at 195 n.2).  Variances are discretionary changes to the sentencing guidelines range 
based on a review of the § 3553(a) factors.  Id. at 226.  In that regard, “[d]istrict courts 
have greater leeway in deciding what to consider in determining whether to vary from the 
Guidelines.”  United States v. Lofink, 564 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2009).  “[We] review[] a 
variance for reasonableness ... by evaluating the district court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) 
factors, whereas [we] review[] a departure [by] consult[ing] the relevant guidelines 
provision in order to determine whether the departure was appropriate.”  Brown, 578 F.3d 
at 226. 
Duong construes the Court’s use of the phrase “not generally relevant” as the 
standard for departures, but we do not think the District Court was confused.  The request 
was plainly for a variance – Duong made no motion for a departure and did not cite to 
any departure provision.  The record shows that the Court understood her request as one 
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for a variance and that it applied the correct standard.3  First, the Court noted that it had 
reviewed “on more than one occasion” all relevant documentation in preparation for 
sentencing, including the presentence report, supplements to the report, sentencing 
memoranda, and character letters.  (App. at 107.)  It then reviewed on the record the 
nature and seriousness of the offense, Duong’s otherwise-clean criminal history, and her 
conduct during supervised released.  Next, it specifically addressed each of the § 3553(a) 
factors, including Duong’s personal circumstances.  After that thorough analysis, it 
granted Duong’s request for a variance and imposed a 70-month sentence, eight months 
below the guidelines range.  We therefore see no error in the sentencing, let alone plain 
error. 
Duong’s final argument is that her sentence was substantively unreasonable as 
“directly connected to the procedural flaw.”  (Opening Br. at 21.)  Because there was no 
procedural error, that substantive unreasonableness argument fails too.   
III.   Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                              
3 The Court had already granted a departure motion prior to her sentencing.  The 
Court’s review of that motion, in comparison with its review of Duong’s variance 
request, indicates that it understood the differences between the two. 
 
